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Comparative Law in the New European
Community
By GEORGE A. BERMANN*
I. Introduction
As a member and leader of America's immediate post-war gen-
eration of comparative lawyers, Rudolf Schlesinger viewed the then
European Economic Community (Community) as an unprecedent-
edly important arena for the theory and practice of comparative law.
He was right in doing so. As we know, the Community initially faced
the prospect, among other things, of harmonizing the laws of six con-
tinental European countries, representing distinct branches of the
European civil law tradition. Then, within a dozen years, the Com-
munity expanded to pick up members that stood on the outskirts of
the European civil law tradition (Denmark) and squarely within the
common law orbit (United Kingdom and Ireland).
For contemporary legal academics (particularly those trained in
European law) who were looking to put the theory and instruments
of comparative law learning to practical and meaningful use, a better
opportunity could hardly be imagined. Legal integration on this am-
bitious scale promised-or rather threatened-to require a detailed
comparison among the substantive laws of the Member States in
comparative law's favorite context: law reform. From a substantive
law point of view, the Community faced a good deal more than the
prospect of aligning their external tariffs. They faced the prospect of
a larger convergence. From the start, the notion of a European mar-
ket without internal barriers raised broad prospects for harmonizing
national economic law in a potentially bewildering range of policy ar-
eas. It became commonplace for Community law to justify virtually
any harmonization measure under article 100 (and later article 100a)
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of the Treaty of Rome or, if need be, under article 235, the implied
powers provision. Thus, the opportunities for law reform through the
comparative method, whether practiced among civil law systems or
between civil and common law systems, appeared to be practically
boundless. It is a small wonder that the Community looked not only
like a bold political and economic experiment, but a true comparative
law adventure!
This strikes me as a perfect occasion to reflect on the nature of
the comparative law enterprise in the Community in which Rudolf
Schlesinger played such an important part. I do not purport in these
remarks to have formed a view that is in any sense definitive for me,
much less for the many others among us who have witnessed and
even participated in it. However, I am prepared to venture a couple
of ideas.
H. The Role of the Civil Law and Common Law Distinction in
the Community's Legal Integration
As to the significance of the civil law-common law distinction in
the Community's legal integration, comparatists simply may have ex-
pected too much. In retrospect, there are several reasons why the ne-
cessity of reconciling civilian and common law thinking was less ur-
gent in the Community lawmaking process than initially envisioned,
even with the eventual accession of common law members.
First, the Community sprung up fully on civil law soil and devel-
oped its legal foundations without any direct influence from a com-
mon law Member State, because there were none. In the first expan-
sion, the Community took on a small minority of common law
Member States. Subsequent expansions did not increase the common
law presence, nor are there prospects for their doing so in the future.
Second, and more basic, Community law primarily developed in
legal fields for which the civil law-common law distinction is simply
not a highly relevant one. It is not that Community law is only about
tariffs and taxes-fields for which the distinction indeed has little if
any significance-because it is not. Community law is, however,
mainly about economic regulation, and it is far from clear that eco-
nomic regulation in the contemporary European nation-state has
much to do with civil law concepts or even with civil law methods.
With the rise of subsidiarity thinking, it is even less likely than before
that Community law will develop in fields close to the civil or com-
mon law core of any State.
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ILL. The Subordinaton of a "Neutral" Harmonization or
Convergence of National Law to the Community's Pursuit of
Its Own Agenda
The experience of the last forty years also shows that pursuit of a
"neutral" harmonization or convergence of national law has consis-
tently been subordinate to the Community's pursuit of its own dis-
tinctive, policy-driven legislative agenda. In retrospect this, too,
should not come as any surprise. The Community's legal construc-
tion was not supposed to be an abstract exercise in comparative law.
Frequently, Community law pursues objectives that may or may not
correspond to the objectives of the national laws upon which it is su-
perimposed. Competition law is the most obvious example.
Even where convergence of national laws was consciously sought
through deliberate harmonization, it has not been sought as an end in
itself. Rather, it was pursued with a view to determining the extent to
which differences in regulatory policy among Member States could
be considered as consistent with a common market and therefore tol-
erable within an economically integrated community. Harmonization
as such was not a driving force; finding a common denominator was
not the Community's agenda.
With imminent and not-so-imminent expansions of the Commu-
nity, it is even less realistic to expect Community law to pursue con-
vergence of Member State law as an end in itself. On the contrary,
the Community can be expected increasingly to pursue its own dis-
tinctive policy objectives, be they consumer protection or construc-
tion of a common market in legal services. The objectives pursued
reflect the evolving shape of the Community and the preoccupations
of the world in which the Community operates. It will be purely inci-
dental if these objectives implicate legal categories in which existing
national laws exhibit interesting similarities or contrasts.
IV. Competition from Other Modes of Legal Analysis
Applying comparative law methodology was logical at the ori-
gins of the Community. In the intervening years, however, other ap-
proaches rose in prominence and showed their own particular utility
in the Community context. Among these approaches, law and eco-
nomics comes chiefly to mind. The coincidence between the growth
of Community law and the rise of the law and economics movement
is an important historical fact, and that movement exerts an under-
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standable appeal in a setting dominated by government regulation of
the economy. The relationship between comparative law analysis
and economic analysis of the law is too vast and unruly a subject to
enter into on this occasion. Suffice it for present purposes to say that
the deliberate pursuit of competing lines of inquiry, such as law and
economics, renders it difficult and quite impossible to pursue the tra-
ditional comparative line of inquiry with the accustomed rigor.
V. The Role of the Community as an International Actor
So absorbing are the challenges of internal legal integration
within the Community, particularly for academic comparative law-
yers, that one can easily forget that strengthening Europe's voice in
the external economic and political arena was and still is among the
Community's most vital purposes. This is something that our friends
in the field of international relations have been telling us for some
time.
Even the casual legal observer cannot fail to note that Commu-
nity lawmaking is increasingly a product of international policymak-
ing processes. The Community is among the most energetic partici-
pants in bilateral, trilateral and more fully multilateral processes.
The result is that international agreements play an ever more impor-
tant role in the shaping of national and regional public policy within
the Community. Entry into bilateral mutual recognition agreements
with the United States, development of trilateral food quality stan-
dards with the United States and Japan, and active participation in
the multilateral World Trade Organization are but the most promi-
nent examples.
This is not, of course, to suggest that comparative law has no role
in this transformation. On the contrary, the trend I describe opens
up new vistas for comparative law. These are not the vistas to which
traditional practitioners of the comparative method in U.S. academia
are accustomed, but these are the vistas that will be important in the
future. Many of us have already begun pursuing the comparative law
dimension of these new international processes.
VI. Conclusion
Assuming that I am not incorrect in my basic observations, what
this adds up to is something quite striking. Even in the cradle of
modern comparative law that is Western Europe, the tools, methods
and very objectives of comparative law continue to change. Even
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here, the comparatist must deal in non-traditional classifications, ac-
knowledge non-neutral policy objectives that drive contemporary le-
gal systems, share the terrain with disciples of other intellectual tradi-
tions, and deploy accustomed methods in an unaccustomed
environment shaped by new international legal processes. Whether
this scenario is one that Rudolf Schlesinger could have anticipated at
the start of, or even well into, his distinguished academic career, it is
one that he would certainly have relished.

